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Abstract 
In response to the German occupation of Belgium in World War I, future U.S. 
president Herbert Hoover and a handful of his colleagues in the mining engineer industry 
founded the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB). The CRB engineered one of the 
greatest relief movements in history partly on account of its successful public appeals; 
nevertheless, the success of these appeals has never been fully explained due to a 
remarkable dearth of scholarship on the topic. This paper seeks to fill in the gap by 
analyzing salient documents in the Mudd Family Papers, located in Honnold/Mudd 
Library’s Special Collections section. The artifacts ultimately evince that the CRB 
tailored its appeals to the American upper and middle classes, appropriating their 
respective motifs and lexicons to successfully mobilize both groups; that rumors of 
wartime atrocities against Belgian children augmented its appeals to the middle class; and 
that it issued targeted messages to its American supporters after the United States’ entry 
into World War I, maintaining vital public support. The findings of this paper promise to 
add invaluable knowledge to an exceedingly understudied historical subject. 
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Historiography 
 Notwithstanding its import to the history of humanitarianism and the greater story 
of World War I, scholars have largely neglected the Commission for Relief in Belgium 
(CRB) in the century since its liquidation. The few extant works devoted to the CRB are 
remarkably scrupulous, anthologizing and summarizing in granular detail its 
administration and operations—yet they fail to adequately articulate the underpinnings of 
its successful public appeals in the United States. Ironically, this holds true in the most 
seminal piece on the subject: George I. Gay and H. H. Fisher’s Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium: Documents. 
As an annotated anthology comprised of countless CRB communications, Public 
Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium includes several examples of the 
Commission’s appeals in the United States, affording a glimpse into the semantics it 
employed. In fact, a handful of the documents contained in the compilation are almost 
identical to artifacts found in the Mudd Family Papers—including ones germane to 
Belgian Kiddies, Ltd., the Rocky Mountain Club, and the CRB’s response to the United 
States’ entry into World War I; nonetheless, Gay and Fisher never explicate these 
documents nor entertain the role of social classes in CRB appeals—even though evidence 
proves the Commission successfully mobilized the American upper and middle classes—
leaving the connection between the Commission’s rhetoric and its target audiences 
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unformed.1 Moreover, unlike the Mudd Family Papers, these documents are not included 
as attachments in larger correspondences, making it difficult to accurately assess their 
efficacy. The only important conclusion they posit on the topic is that the CRB’s $52.3 
million fund—much of which stemmed from the Commission’s public appeals—
“provided invaluable support before government subsidies were granted and indicated the 
strength of the world-wide moral support of the undertaking, which was an important 
factor in securing government assistance.”2 
Herbert Hoover echoes this notion in An American Epic, Volume 1: The Relief of 
Belgium and Northern France, 1914-1930, remarking that the CRB’s fund—and hence 
its public appeals—was vital to the enterprise’s overall success for the same reasons cited 
by Gay and Fisher.3 Additionally, he supplies statistics showing that American 
contributions far exceeded those from other nations.4 This is essentially all that he says 
on the matter, as his work is an anthology—similar to Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium—that emphasizes his administrative experiences over 
other CRB operations. 
The academic piece that comes closest to explaining the strategies that animated 
the CRB’s successful public appeals is Ryan Thomas Austin’s 2009 doctoral dissertation, 
“Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’ the Commission for Relief in 
1 George I. Gay and H. H. Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium: Documents (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1929), Chapter XV: Parts 
6 and 7, accessed April 20, 2015, http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/CRB/CRB1-
TC.htm. 
2 Ibid., Chapter XV: Introduction. 
3 Herbert Hoover, An American Epic, Volume 1: The Relief of Belgium and Northern 
France, 1914-1930 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), 32. 
4 Ibid., 31. 
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Belgium: 1914-1915.” Austin devotes a chapter to the “Public Relations of the CRB 
(1914-1915)” wherein he recapitulates the content of the CRB’s public appeals.5 His 
summaries occasionally hint that class distinctions may have played a part in CRB 
appeals: for instance, he notes that many of them “focused on babies and children in 
particular as the innocent victims that suffered most tragically,” and that Hoover—at one 
of his myriad engagements as keynote speaker—“personalized the experience of Belgians 
by painting a picture of what life would be like in America if they faced similar 
circumstances.”6 Like Gay and Fisher, however, Austin does not formally consider the 
possibility that the CRB tailored its appeals for respective social classes—an idea that 
could help explain their success. Austin’s dissertation is also limited because it only treats 
the CRB’s first two years of existence, leaving out appeals made subsequent to the 
United States’ declaration of war on Germany in 1917. 
In sum, the minimal literature on the CRB demonstrates that its public appeals 
were integral to its overall success and that the United States contributed the most to its 
influential charity fund. The works also suggest that the CRB employed different motifs 
for different audiences—but none of them seriously entertain the role of class distinctions 
in CRB appeals. Finally, all of them fail to touch on an external factor that likely 
augmented the CRB’s appeals: rumors of wartime atrocities against Belgian children. The 
current state of knowledge on the CRB’s public appeals is therefore wanting, begging 
further research. 
5 Ryan Thomas Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’ the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium: 1914-1915” (PhD diss., Iowa State University, 2009), 
169-79. 
6 Ibid., 173-5. 
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Introduction 
 On June 28, 1914, a Yugoslav nationalist discharged a fatal volley of shots that 
ignited a worldwide diplomatic conflagration.7 In the four years of ghastly warfare that 
followed, modern weapons would be employed at an unprecedented scale, converting 
vast swaths of the globe—especially Europe—into death factories.8 Entire nations would 
be mobilized to annihilate their opponents, signaling a new era of “total war.”9 A 
generation of “shell-shocked” soldiers would be birthed in the trenches, leaving millions 
with permanent physical and emotional scars.10 Several empires would collapse, giving 
way to new governments and transfiguring the international balance of power.11 In all, 
nine million soldiers and twelve million civilians would perish.12 But perhaps most 
importantly, the vindictive peace that followed incubated the requisite conditions for an 
even bloodier and costlier war two decades later.13 
 This is the conventional history of the Great War—better known today as World 
War I—that has been rendered for generations of students. For the better part of the past 
century, it has helped inform policymakers navigating through a world beset by 
7 Gerard J. de Groot, The First World War (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave, 2001), 1. 
8 Ibid., 168-73. 
9 Ibid., 135-60. Michael S. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A Global History 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 282. 
10 de Groot, The First World War, 174-6. 
11 Ibid., 185-97. 
12 Ibid., 1. 
13 Ibid., 197-9. 
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intractable international conflict; however, perhaps because of the war’s manifest tragedy 
and its bearing on subsequent hostilities, the traditional narrative has largely omitted the 
uplifting yet equally salient chapters that underscore mankind’s fathomless capacity for 
generosity. Of these, the story of the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB)—an 
organization that countered an array of social ills precipitated by the German occupation 
of Belgium and Northern France—is both the most incredible and curiously understudied. 
The CRB was by no means the first salient example of American-led international 
relief. Americans made their first foray into global philanthropy in 1816, when Bostonian 
merchants shipped emergency supplies to St. John’s, Newfoundland after the city 
suffered an especially devastating fire.14 In the ensuing decades, the American people 
made valuable charitable contributions to a multiplicity of beleaguered nations—most 
notably the Greeks during their War of Independence and the Irish during their Potato 
Famine.15 Domestically, Americans conceived charity organization societies in the 1870s 
and 1880s to allay a host of ills endemic in traditional antebellum charities, including 
shoddy “coordination, vision, and planning” as well as “wasteful and inefficient” 
practices.16 Yet American philanthropy abroad through the late nineteenth century 
remained an “ad hoc” and “broadly generalized” enterprise “without a series of 
overriding principles or an organizational strategy.”17 
 The American response to the Russian famine of the early 1890s finally 
introduced some semblance of organization to American philanthropy overseas, 
14 Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 15. 
15 Ibid., 15-7. 
16 Ibid., 24-5. 
17 Ibid., 14. 
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presaging the undertakings of the CRB. William C. Edgar—editor of the Minneapolis-
based Northwestern Miller—began leading the charge for relief to Russia in December 
1891.18 In his appeals, he argued that it was the duty of millers to act “in the name of 
humanity” rather than their customary religious impulses and redistribute the United 
States’ oversupply of wheat, corn, and flour.19 Edgar also posited that a robust display of 
miller benevolence could serve as an advertising opportunity for their industry, “[calling] 
worldwide attention to America’s plenteous store” of foodstuffs.20 By February 1892, he 
announced that the steamer Missouri would transport collections free of charge, and that 
an American Red Cross official—as well as a Northwestern Miller staff member—would 
“accompany the relief shipment and check on the distribution of the provisions by the 
Russian Red Cross and the czarist government.”21 Nine mills each donated hundreds of 
flour sacks, and in all, the Missouri shipped 5.6 million pounds of flour and corn valued 
at $100,000 “representing 800 subscriptions from twenty-five states and territories.”22 
In addition to Edgar’s efforts, John W. Hoyt—former editor of the Wisconsin 
Farmer and Northwestern Cultivator and recent governor of Wyoming Territory—
organized a formal “Russian Famine Committee of the United States” to lobby Congress 
for “authorization for the transport of voluntary food contributions by the US Navy.”23 
The group was comprised of the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, fifteen senators, 
18 Ibid., 26. Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad: A History (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963), 101. 
19 Ibid. Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 26. 
20 Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, 101. 
21 Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 26-7. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 27. Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, 109. 
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and several distinguished religious leaders.24 Although its lobbying work proved 
abortive, the committee managed to muster $10,000 for the Red Cross.25 Including all 
other contributions from discrete relief groups, it is estimated that Americans donated 
approximately $1 million to the Russian relief effort—a paltry sum compared to the 
subsequent achievements of the CRB.26 Still, Americans contributed far more during the 
crisis “than any other people except the Russians themselves.”27 
The turn of the twentieth century also saw the emergence of the American Red 
Cross as a chief vehicle of American philanthropy overseas.28 Founded in 1881, it was 
reorganized by Congress in 1905 so it could “pursue a system of national and 
international relief in times of peace by mitigating suffering caused by pestilence, famine, 
floods, and other national calamities.”29 The American Red Cross ultimately “contributed 
[$1.64 million] to natural disaster relief abroad” in the sixteen-year interval between the 
Spanish-American War and World War I.30 Nonetheless, it was ill-prepared “for large 
scale funding and relief programs abroad” on the eve of 1914, with only 150 chapters and 
20,000 members.31 The activities of the American Red Cross were also limited “when 
national interests involving foreign policy and security became involved” on account of 
its affiliation with the federal government.32 Ultimately, the milieu wherein the CRB 
materialized was wanting: while some Americans held a measure of experience in 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 27. 
26 Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, 115. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 42. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 42-3. 
31 Ibid., 43. 
32 Ibid., 42. 
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extending benevolence overseas, most were woefully unready for the prodigious 
demands of relief in a world war. 
Unlike the early American Red Cross, the CRB would predicate itself on 
negotiating the hazards of international politics. Prior to the summer of 1914, the 
emergence of the “Triple Entente” gave the German military cause to anticipate a two-
front conflict pitted against France in the west and Russia in the east.33 Count Graf von 
Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff, conceived an official stratagem for this 
eventuality: Germany would first achieve victory in the western theater by making a 
“lightning-quick invasion [of France] through Belgium”—notwithstanding the latter’s 
potential neutrality—and subsequently send forces east to address the Russian threat.34 
Schlieffen believed an invasion of Belgium would be necessary on account of the 
country’s flat landscape, which would expedite the German military’s march to Paris.35 
Once hostilities commenced in the First World War, Germany activated the “Schlieffen 
Plan” and attacked Belgium on August 4, 1914.36 Within weeks, Germany had cleared 
the country and entered French territory.37 The Allies finally repelled the German 
advance in September 1914 at the Battle of the Marne, but the trench stalemate that 
33 de Groot, The First World War, 12. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Vernon Kellogg, Fighting Starvation in Belgium (New York: Doubleday, Page & 
Company, 1918), 5. 
37 de Groot, The First World War, 30-2. 
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followed left approximately ten million Belgian and French civilians behind German 
lines until October 1918—one month before the Armistice.38 
Thus began Germany’s protracted occupation of Belgium and Northern France. 
Almost instantly, Germany cut off the commercial supply chain to the region, decimating 
a place “dependent on imports for 70 per cent of [its] food, practically all of [its] textiles 
and clothing, and most of [its] leather and other industrial raw materials.”39 By October 
1914, observers remarked that Belgium was “on the point of starvation.”40 People in the 
cities “had less than ten days’ bread supply.”41 Children were especially vulnerable 
“since the usual imports of dairy products were no longer available.”42 A handful of 
prominent Americans and Belgians collaborated swiftly to assuage the country’s 
miseries, establishing relief networks in the immediate aftermath of the German 
invasion—most notably the Comité Nationale de Secours et d’Alimentation (CN); but as 
domestic foodstuff reserves became depleted, they increasingly perceived the need for 
greater overseas assistance.43 
During these critical months, Herbert Hoover—future President of the United 
States, then an eminent mining engineer—commanded the American Citizens’ Relief 
Committee in London, helping to repatriate a total of 120,000 Americans stranded by the 
38 Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 27. Herbert Hoover, An American Epic, Volume 1: 
The Relief of Belgium and Northern France, 1914-1930 (Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Company, 1959), xxi. 
39 Ibid., xxi. 
40 Ibid., 8. 
41 Ibid., 2. 
42 Ibid. 
43 David Burner, Herbert Hoover: A Public Life (New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1979), 74. 
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flare-up in Europe.44 Impressed by his successes, leaders of the early Belgian relief 
networks implored Hoover to manage the importation of relief supplies into the city of 
Brussels and potentially all of Belgium.45 Hoover answered the call despite some initial 
misgivings, and on October 22, he convened a meeting in his office with his “American 
engineer friends in London.”46 Originally planning for a “wholly American” relief effort, 
the men in attendance elected to form the “American Commission for Relief in 
Belgium”; nevertheless, they soon “realized that the organization would be stronger” with 
the supplemental patronage of neutral Spanish and Dutch officials.47 The word 
“American” was dropped from their title a few days later, creating the CRB brand as it 
was henceforth known.48 
The CRB gradually expanded its scope to include relief activities for all of 
Belgium in the months subsequent to its founding.49 By March 1915, the CRB took 
charge of relief efforts in German-occupied Northern France as well.50 Over the course of 
the war, the CRB developed for itself “six parallel tasks of organization”: 
(1) To build up [the] organization for purchase and overseas shipments of 
supplies; (2) To secure adequate agreements from the Germans to protect 
imported and native supplies in Belgium and immunity of attack on [CRB] ships 
en route; (3) To secure adequate agreements with the Allies for passage of [CRB] 
supplies through the blockade and liberty of action to charter ships; (4) To 
organize the charity of the world; (5) To obtain financial support from the Allies 
44 Ibid., 73. 
45 Hoover, An American Epic, Volume 1, 2. 
46 Ibid., 3. 
47 Ibid., 4. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 2. 
50 Hoover, An American Epic, Volume 1, 18. 
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and possibly from the Germans; (6) To build up organization of the Belgians for 
adequate distribution.51 
 
To execute these assignments, the CRB erected itself on the volunteer leadership of 
Hoover’s American mining engineer cohorts.52 Notwithstanding Hoover’s personal 
connections, this group was asked to become the nucleus of the CRB’s administrative 
personnel because they were seasoned in the art of diplomacy and hailed as the world’s 
best-trained “administrators of enterprises.”53 The CRB ultimately assigned these men to 
direct offices in all the theaters of its operations.54 
 A British Foreign Office official once referred to the logistical juggernaut that 
Hoover and his colleagues assembled as a “piratical state organization for 
benevolence.”55 Indeed, by November 1914, the CRB became recognized on all sides “as 
a kind of informal state with its own international agreements under special privileges 
and immunities granted by the belligerents.”56 The CRB bought the preponderance of its 
raw relief provisions in purchasing centers throughout the Americas—most notably New 
York City.57 From there, the supplies went aboard a convoy of fifty to sixty customized 
ships donning a CRB flag and “huge illuminated signs” bearing the “Belgian Relief 
51 Ibid.,15. 
52 Ibid., 34. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 35-6. 
55 Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 335. 
56 Ibid., 90. 
57 Bruno Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 207. “The Commission for Relief in 
Belgium C.R.B. (1914),” The Belgian American Educational Foundation, accessed 
March 1, 2015, http://www.baef.be/documents/about-us/history/the-commission-for-
relief-in-belgium-1914-.xml?lang=en. 
                                                          
  18 
 
Committee” title—all designed to indicate their privileged, neutral status.58 The ships 
then docked in Rotterdam, where “the cargo was unloaded, warehoused, repackaged and 
sent by rail and canal to Belgium” and Northern France.59 Finally, under the auspices of 
the CRB, the existing CN—as well as its sister organization in Northern France, the 
“CF”—distributed the supplies to their respective populations through ration cards.60 
 An assortment of sources funded the CRB throughout its existence. For the first 
four months, the CRB was especially reliant on charitable donations.61 Most of these 
contributions arrived from the United States, the British Empire, Spain, and South 
America, where the CRB’s central press agency made targeted charity appeals through 
affiliated local subcommittees.62 Afterwards, the CRB secured government loans from 
Britain, France, and later the United States, which added to its finances tremendously; 
nevertheless, the CRB continued its public charity appeals until shortly after the United 
States’ entry into the war.63 In all, the CRB received 75 percent of its finances from 
government appropriations and 5.6 percent from its public charity fund.64 
 At the conclusion of its nearly five-year existence, the CRB had successfully 
engineered one of the greatest humanitarian movements in the history of mankind. An 
58 Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 207. Hoover, An 
American Epic, Volume 1, 27. 
59 “The Commission for Relief in Belgium C.R.B. (1914),” The Belgian American 
Educational Foundation. Hoover, An American Epic, Volume 1, 19. 
60 Ibid., 18-9. Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 207. 
61 Ibid., 30-2. 
62 Ibid., 30-1. Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 11-171. 
Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter XV: 
Introduction. 
63 Hoover, An American Epic, Volume 1, 32-415. 
64 Ibid., 415. 
                                                          
  19 
 
approximate total of 137,000 people—the vast majority of whom were volunteers— 
operated in some capacity for the Commission, allowing it to import nearly 5.2 million 
tons of relief supplies into Belgium and Northern France.65 The CRB’s final receipts 
totaled $930.5 million—a figure “unprecedented in the history of philanthropy.”66 The 
Commission’s charity fund of $52.3 million also “[amounted] to the largest fund known 
up to that time.”67 Including internal purchases in the occupied territories, the CRB 
leveraged a total of $2.8 billion for the relief movement.68 
These herculean efforts paid epic dividends, making the CRB “the first recorded 
moment in history in which a group of humanitarians contained on such a scale the 
civilian suffering brought about by war.”69 The CRB’s work “saved hundreds of 
thousands of lives,” keeping Belgium’s death rate at a trivial 0.5% while the Great War 
wreaked havoc on the rest of the continent.70 Incredibly, “the child mortality rate in 
Belgium and [Northern] France was lower under the CRB than it had ever been 
before.”71 David Burner—author of Herbert Hoover: A Public Life—even opined that 
“had similar help been given to all of Europe after the war, the chronic problems that 
gave way to another war might have been avoided.”72 Finally, the CRB represented a 
65 Ibid., 33-415. 
66 Hoover, An American Epic, Volume 1, 415. Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter IV: Introduction. 
67 Hoover, An American Epic, Volume 1, 31. 
68 Ibid., 416. 
69 Burner, Herbert Hoover, 74. 
70 Ibid., 94. Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 335. 
71 Burner, Herbert Hoover, 94. 
72 Ibid. 
                                                          
  20 
 
profound paradigm shift in humanitarian work, “[revolutionizing]” the logistics of relief 
distribution and ushering in a new era of private, professionalized charity organizations.73 
Despite the incontrovertible success of the CRB, scholars have paid surprisingly 
scant attention to the movement in the past century. The few that have treated the subject, 
however, usually explain the CRB’s historic success by pointing to a slew of factors—
including the expert leadership and political dexterity of Hoover and his American 
mining engineer associates, the receipt of neutral privileges and immunities from the 
belligerent countries, and the efficiency of its administration and distribution systems.74 
In addition, all sources agree that the CRB’s public appeals were central to its success, as 
they augmented the groundbreaking charity fund that financed the Commission in its first 
months and signaled the worldwide moral support of the enterprise—an important factor 
in securing and maintaining government loans. Yet the existing scholarship on the CRB’s 
public appeals is deficient for a number of reasons: 1. It fails to consider the role of class 
distinctions in CRB appeals—even though evidence demonstrates that the Commission 
successfully mobilized the American upper and middle classes; 2. It neglects to assess the 
import of wartime rumors to CRB appeals; and 3. It does not connect the CRB’s appeals 
subsequent to the United States’ declaration of war on Germany with the Commission’s 
maintenance of public support. 
Thankfully, the Mudd Family Papers promise to fill in these gaps. The Claremont 
Colleges Library’s primary facility, “Honnold/Mudd Library,” is named after two of its 
73 Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 206-19. 
74 Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 81-335. 
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chief benefactors: William L. Honnold and Seeley W. Mudd.75 Both were eminent 
American mining engineers at the turn of the twentieth century—meaning both partook in 
the CRB’s efforts in some capacity.76 Honnold, in fact, served as a director of two CRB 
offices, and Seeley W. Mudd was both a member of the “General Committee of the 
Rocky Mountain Club-Hoover Fund” and a prominent donor for Belgian Kiddies, Ltd 
(see Appendix A, Figure VI and Appendix B, Figure I).77 The namesake of Harvey Mudd 
College and mining engineer son of Seeley W. Mudd—Harvey S. Mudd—contributed 
financially to Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. as well (see Appendix B, Figure II and Appendix E, 
Figure I). 
For the betterment of posterity, these men bequeathed many records of their 
experiences assisting the CRB to Honnold/Mudd Library’s Special Collections section—
and a large number of them are currently located in the Mudd Family Papers. This 
collection happens to host an amalgam of materials germane to the CRB’s public appeals, 
affording an opportunity for researchers to understand their unequivocal success. 
Ultimately, the artifacts reveal three key explanations for the CRB’s successful public 
appeals: 1. The Commission disseminated tailored appeals to the American upper and 
middle classes, appropriating their respective motifs and lexicons to successfully 
mobilize both groups; 2. Rumors of wartime atrocities against Belgian children 
augmented its appeals to the middle class; and 3. It issued targeted messages to its 
75 “Honnold/Mudd Library: A Brief History,” Claremont Colleges Library, accessed 
March 1, 2015, http://libraries.claremont.edu/about/libraries/honnold/honnoldhistory.asp. 
76 “Guide to the William L. Honnold Papers,” Online Archive of California, accessed 
March 1, 2015, http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c89s1rpp/. “Guide to the 
Mudd Family Papers,” Online Archive of California, accessed March 1, 2015, 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt0m3nd52d/. 
77 Hoover, An American Epic, Volume 1, 35. 
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American supporters after the United States’ entry into World War I, maintaining vital 
public support. 
The following essay will dissect these artifacts and articulate their implications in 
three distinct chapters. The first will discern how CRB appeals mobilized the upper class 
by analyzing Hoover’s January 29, 1917 address to the Rocky Mountain Club as well as 
the Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stock. The second will determine how the Commission’s 
appeals and wartime rumors mobilized the middle class, examining A Plea for One 
Million Belgian Children and letters from Helen C. Foote to the CRB. The third will 
distill how the CRB maintained public support following the United States’ declaration of 
war on Germany by inspecting a letter from Hoover to the supporters of the Commission. 
Subsequent to these chapters, the essay will briefly discuss the relationship between the 
appeals of the CRB and the American Relief Administration (ARA). 
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Chapter 1: Mobilizing the Upper Class 
One explanation for the CRB’s patent success has never been in contention: the 
unprecedented contributions of Hoover and his network of affluent, mostly American 
mining engineer friends. Not only were these men responsible for conceiving the 
organization and effectively shepherding it through the duration of the war, but they also 
played a profound role in augmenting the CRB’s historic fund, submitting large sum 
donations as individuals or through their own organizations—including a noteworthy 
$200,000 donation from the Rockefeller Foundation.78 In no way can the import of their 
leadership be overstated: according to Merle Curti, “Belgium would have starved without 
the brilliant help of Hoover and his associates.”79 The CRB’s overall success was thus 
contingent on the Commission’s effective mobilization of the American upper class—
especially the mining engineers with whom Hoover collaborated. 
In Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Gay and Fisher 
highlight a pair of especially salient mining engineer-led organizations that helped the 
CRB galvanize this cohort: 
Two institutions with which Hoover was personally connected employed 
interesting methods of increasing their donations. The American Institute of 
Mining Engineer [sic] organized a campaign to sell shares in “Belgian Kiddies, 
Ltd.” The entire amount of “preferred stock” $120,000 was soon pledged. Under 
the leadership of John Hays Hammond and W. B. Thompson, the Rocky 
78 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter 
XV: Part 5. 
79 Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, 235. 
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Mountain Club, composed largely of mining engineers, set up the “Rocky 
Mountain Club-Hoover Fund for Belgian Relief” and in view of the need in 
Belgium deferred the erection of a clubhouse for which plans were well advanced. 
At a complimentary dinner to Hoover on the 20th January 1917 the Fund was 
open with an anonymous $100,000 donation.80 
 
Unsurprisingly, sundry documents in the Mudd Family Papers indicate that Seeley W. 
Mudd and Harvey S. Mudd—both mining engineers—partook in the two noteworthy 
movements. A handful of the papers—including an address by Hoover to the Rocky 
Mountain Club, as well as the Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stock themselves— help to explain 
how the CRB successfully marshaled the talents and resources of the American upper 
class, demonstrating that the Commission appropriated capitalist motifs and lexicon in its 
appeals to the mining engineers. 
I. Proceedings at Reception and Dinner to Herbert C. Hoover, Chairman, Commission 
for Relief in Belgium, by Rocky Mountain Club – January 29, 1917 
 a. Survey of Pertinent Document Features 
 The Rocky Mountain Club was unquestionably marked by remarkable affluence 
and clout. As aforementioned, the club was “composed largely of mining engineers,” but 
it also embraced in its ranks “railroad men and capitalists.”81 Incorporated “to create 
good-fellowship among the members and advance the interests of the Rocky Mountain 
States” in the United States’ economic capital, New York City, the group was 
characterized by the New York Times as “[possibly] the richest club in the world,” with 
80 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter 
XV: Part 6. 
81 Ibid. “Enroll Westerners for Service in War,” The New York Times, March 13, 1917. 
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John Hays Hammond—“reputed to be the highest salaried mining engineer in the world” 
in 1907—serving as its president.82 Another prominent member of the organization was 
former U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt, who went on to act as the Honorary Chairman 
of the Rocky Mountain Club-Hoover Fund.83 In consideration of the club’s composition 
of economic and political heavyweights, it is axiomatic that Hoover tailored his speech 
for a decidedly upper class audience. 
Predictably, Hoover’s address to the Rocky Mountain Club on January 29, 1917 is 
replete with corporate themes and rhetoric, reading like a prototypical sales pitch. John 
Hays Hammond and A. J. Hemphill introduce Hoover in gushing terms, explaining that 
his oratorical cogence and superlative record with the CRB prompted the club’s 
governors to postpone the erection of a new clubhouse and establish a “Hoover Fund” in 
direct support of the larger CRB fund nine days prior (see Appendix A, Figure I).84 
Hoover ostensibly receives these praises bashfully, yet he quickly launches the corpus of 
his speech in an assured, methodological fashion that asks club members to envision their 
own economic capital under martial duress—thereby underscoring the deleterious effects 
of the German occupation on Belgium’s logistics, economy, and overall well-being:  
... imagine New York and about five adjoining counties occupied by an enemy 
army, blockaded from without, and surrounded with a wall of steel, the normal 
flow of food, seventy per cent. of which food normally comes from without, 
stopped, you would awaken within thirty-six hours to find your markets empty, 
and your bakeries stopped. Add to this that your railways would be taken over for 
military purposes; that your telephones and telegraphs would be suppressed; ... 
[the] feeling that the food supply of the community, the food supply to the 
82 “New Club in Times Square,” The New York Times, November 1, 1907. 
83 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter 
XV: Part 6. 
84 Ibid. 
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individual, may cease at any moment; that your women and children are in 
imminent jeopardy... That has been the situation of Belgium and Northern France 
with 10,000,000 of people, for nearly two years... (see Appendix A, Figure II). 
 
Hoover then recapitulates the history of the CRB, noting that “the Belgian people 
themselves sent up the first plea to the Americans for help,” while also supplying 
impressive statistics pertaining to the CRB’s relief efforts (see Appendix A, Figure III). 
He continues his address by making a direct appeal to the capitalist sensibilities of his 
audience: “It will occur to every businessman to know something of this organization. 
Everyone has a right to know whether it is efficient; whether it is honest, and whether it 
accomplishes its purposes. Now there have been three tenets of this organization: the first 
is de-centralization; second, voluntary service, and third, high ideals” (see Appendix A, 
Figure III). Assuming his audience trusts the CRB and its irreproachable mission, Hoover 
commences to confirm the efficiency and success of the organization by first referencing 
the value of voluntarism: “We realized from the start that it was necessary to have the co-
operation of every intelligent man in Belgium and Northern France...” (see Appendix A, 
Figure III). Secondly, he limns its decentralized, subcommittee dependent structure: “We 
have built up by degrees some four or five thousand committees recruiting charity 
throughout the world, and we have recruited about thirty millions of dollars, of which 
about nine millions came from this country” (see Appendix A, Figure III). 
After bemoaning the hazards of the food distribution process, Hoover introduces 
another layer of CRB labors, mentioning that “relief work consists not alone in the 
distribution of food, but in the handling of destitution” (see Appendix A, Figure III). To 
him, ameliorating unemployment and establishing economic self-reliance is imperative to 
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the survival of the relief movement: “There is in Belgium about fifty per cent. of 
unemployment, and about seventy per cent. in the North of France... They must have the 
means with which to obtain food; it is not enough to give them rations, they must have 
the means with which to buy their own production and their own local food supply” (see 
Appendix A, Figure III). 
Hoover’s rhetoric grows increasingly alarmist hereafter: as if to initiate a class 
competition for charity, Hoover announces that the CRB’s “[appeal] to the American 
public to assume [the] responsibility” of furnishing $1 per child per month “failed” (see 
Appendix A, Figure IV). Since the CRB is allegedly “$3,000,000 to $5,000,000 a month 
short”—a figure that “is crushing to [America’s] national pride” if allowed to stand—
Hoover beseeches his mining friends to answer the call of duty (see Appendix A, Figure 
IV). In contrast to the “American public,” Hoover is nearly certain his “friends” and 
mining engineer colleagues in the Rocky Mountain Club will donate generously, as they 
responded superlatively to an appeal he made years earlier on behalf of “distress work” in 
Australian mines (see Appendix A, Figure IV). Finally, Hoover concludes his address by 
highlighting the reputational implications of American charity: 
Now, gentlemen, this matter is one of more importance even than the feeding of 
1,250,000 children, as large as that may be. This relief has come to be America’s 
greatest exhibit in Europe... We want to give a demonstration of that great strain 
of humanity which we know runs through our people because we know the 
character of the people that make up this Republic (see Appendix A, Figure IV). 
 
 
 
  28 
 
b. Overview of Herbert Hoover 
Hoover’s speech to the Rocky Mountain Club on January 29, 1917 unequivocally 
evinces the turn-of-the-century capitalist ethos shared by Hoover and his American upper 
class peers. Born to a humble Iowan household on August 10, 1874, Hoover and his 
siblings became orphans after the deaths of their father in 1880 and their mother in 
1884.85 Hoover attended night school while working for his uncle in Oregon, and 
although he never received a high school diploma and failed nearly all his college 
entrance exams, he passed remedial courses and subsequently matriculated to Stanford 
University in 1891—its inaugural year.86 In Palo Alto, he studied geology, graduating in 
1895; two years later, he entered the mining engineer business with employment in 
Australia.87 Hoover quickly ascended through the ranks of the industry, becoming one of 
the world’s more prolific mining engineers by the eve of the First World War.88 
Ideologically, Hoover aligned himself with many of his affluent contemporaries. 
As a self-made capitalist, Hoover subscribed to the “self-help” paradigm of philanthropy 
popularized by Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, which eschewed 
indiscriminate charity in favor of targeted philanthropic practices that enabled the 
destitute to become self-reliant.89 Curti notes in American Philanthropy Abroad that 
Hoover’s adherence to “self-help” philanthropy imbued the mission and organization of 
the CRB: “... as Hoover himself realized, Belgian participation in the relief work added 
85 Burner, Herbert Hoover, 5-11. 
86 Ibid., 15-6. 
87 Ibid., 17-26 
88 Ibid., 27-62 
89 Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 20-2. 
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immensely to its overall effectiveness. Enabling Belgians to help themselves and to 
regain their feet economically was for Hoover a primary objective of the relief.”90 
Hoover also approached his forays into humanitarianism with ulterior, economic 
motives predicated on the ubiquitous philanthropic doctrine of “trusteeship.” According 
to Bruno Cabanes in The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924, 
“Hoover was sincerely moved by the distress of French and Belgian civilians, but he did 
not lose sight of the political and economic advantages of the entire operation.”91 Hoover 
specifically “hoped that the work of the CRB would eventually create new markets for 
American exports.”92 These underlying intentions were profoundly colored by the works 
and writings of Carnegie and Rockefeller, who posited that the upper class, as deserving 
“trustees” of large sums of capital, should have the prerogative to redistribute wealth on 
their own volition; thus, in a February 1, 1917 address to the New York Chamber of 
Commerce—one that is strikingly similar to his Rocky Mountain Club speech made two 
days earlier—Hoover reasoned that the United States, being the world’s “rich man,” had 
a mandate to promote “Americanism” and capitalist values in Europe: 
... it was our opportunity to demonstrate that great strain of humanity and idealism 
which built up and in every essential crisis saved our Republic... The justification 
of any rich man in the community is his trusteeship to the community for his 
wealth. The justification of America to the world-community to-day is her 
trusteeship to the world-community for the property which she holds... We have 
tried to keep the lamp of humanity alight and to implant true Americanism in 
Europe.93 
 
90 Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad, 235. 
91 Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 207. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 208. 
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 c. Import of Document to Upper Class Mobilization 
In light of this evidence, Hoover’s January 29, 1917 speech to the Rocky 
Mountain Club clarifies the means by which the CRB successfully mobilized the 
American upper class, revealing that it invoked the semantics and motifs of capitalism in 
addresses to key capitalist networks. By compelling his audience to vicariously 
experience the German occupation in an American setting, Hoover highlights the 
manifest symbiotic relationship between economic health and individual well-being; in 
doing so, he establishes that the plight of Belgium and Northern France can be 
ameliorated through targeted philanthropy that promotes business and individual self-
reliance. This theme is repeated several times throughout his speech: the Belgian people 
are deserving of assistance because they “themselves sent up the first plea to the 
Americans”—but rather than doling out mere rations, the CRB must supply the Belgians 
and their French neighbors “the means with which to buy their own production and their 
own local food supply.” Hoover’s espousal of the “self-help” doctrine almost 
undoubtedly resonated with the Rocky Mountain Club, as its turn-of-the-twentieth-
century capitalist members were likely averse to inklings of indiscriminate charity. 
Hoover further wins over his “businessman” audience by positing that it is an 
economically sound decision to succor the CRB. According to him, the CRB is a frugal 
yet effective organization on account of its decentralized, subcommittee and volunteer 
reliant system—meaning every dollar donated will be well spent. Hoover also contends 
that it is absolutely imperative for the United States and its leaders to leave a positive 
impression on the peoples of Belgium, Northern France, and Europe at large through the 
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CRB, “America’s greatest exhibit in Europe”; in fact, to Hoover, it is a “matter” more 
important “than the feeding of 1,250,000 children” since it can promote Americanism and 
foster capitalism in Europe, paving the way for access to untapped and underexploited 
markets. While this logic certainly struck a chord with the Rocky Mountain Club 
members’ profit-driven predilections, Hoover’s language of patriotic paternalism likely 
piqued the interests of an audience already well versed in the associated “trusteeship” 
doctrine. 
Finally, Hoover’s anxieties about the CRB’s “failed” appeal to the American 
public likely had a degree of merit: according to Burner, he “was chagrined that 
Australians and many others were contributing much more than Americans”—and 
indeed, the CRB disseminated pamphlets underscoring that “Britain, Australia, and New 
Zealand contributed 22 cents, $1.34, and $2.29 respectively [per person],” while the 
United States only “donated 10 cents per person.”94 Yet as will be discussed in the 
following chapter, the American middle class actually made impressive contributions to 
the CRB—rendering his claim more inflammatory than factual. As a result, Hoover’s 
mentioning of the American public’s “shortcomings” suggests that the CRB purposefully 
challenged the upper class to “compete” charitably with the middle class—a strategy that 
ultimately proved fruitful. By appropriating capitalist rhetoric and themes throughout, 
Hoover’s January 29, 1917 Rocky Mountain Club address ultimately elucidates how the 
CRB attempted to convince the upper class of its mission’s rectitude and economical 
prudence. 
94 Burner, Herbert Hoover, 91. Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for 
benevolence,’” 173. 
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Correspondences between Hammond and Seeley W. Mudd, a member of the 
Rocky Mountain Club, demonstrate the incredible efficacy of CRB speeches and 
pamphlets tailored to the upper class—including Hoover’s January 29, 1917 Rocky 
Mountain Club address. Hammond enclosed the Hoover speech in a letter to Mudd on 
February 15, 1917, explaining the establishment of the Rocky Mountain Club-Hoover 
Fund and offering high praise for Hoover: “Never has a story of human suffering so 
aroused our sympathies as did Mr. Hoover’s presentation of the plight of the children of 
Belgium” (see Appendix A, Figure V). Mudd summarily agreed to serve as a “Member of 
the General Committee of the Rocky Mountain Club-Hoover Fund,” and on February 23, 
Hammond replied confirming his new position (see Appendix A, Figure VI). Then, on 
March 6—while in Colorado Springs, Colorado—Mudd messaged Hammond informing 
him of his decision to increase his “monthly subscription from $150.00 per month to 
$500.00 per month” and relating that the Rocky Mountain Club’s actions were “met with 
great approval in [his] section of the country” (see Appendix A, Figure VII). Clearly, 
Hoover’s tailored speech resonated with his mining engineer colleagues, allowing the 
CRB to reap from the brightest minds and deepest wallets in the industry. In a similar 
vein, the Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stock corroborates that the CRB tapped into the unrivaled 
resources of the American upper class through the motifs and lexicon of capitalism. 
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II. Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. Stock 
 a. Overview of Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. and Survey of Pertinent Document 
Features 
 The brainchild of D. H. Browne from the International Nickel Company, Belgian 
Kiddies, Ltd. was incorporated on January 9, 1917 during the annual dinner of the 
Mining and Metallurgic Society in New York City.95 Chartered to “work through the 
[CRB],” it was intended to fulfill Hoover’s goal of “[guaranteeing] every child in 
Belgium at least one meal a day” by contributing to the needs of exactly “ten thousand 
Belgian children for the year 1917.”96 To do so, Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. “[issued] ‘stock’ at 
a par value of $12 a share,” and eventually—as noted by Gay and Fisher—“the entire 
amount of ‘preferred stock’ $120,000 was... pledged.”97 Although the organization 
allowed its $12 stock—worth $220 in 2015—to be bought in payment plans, it 
nonetheless “preferred” their “subscribers [to be] taken from the members of the mining 
and metallurgical professions, and their wives and sisters”—meaning that the enterprise 
was certainly customized for the upper class.98 
 The Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stock in the Mudd Family Papers shows that Seeley W. 
Mudd and Harvey S. Mudd subscribed to enormous contributions of $480 and $50—or 
95 “Belgian Kiddies, Ltd., A New Relief Society,” The New York Times, January 10, 
1917. 
96 Ibid. Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, 
Chapter XV: Part 5. 
97 “Belgian Kiddies, Ltd., A New Relief Society,” The New York Times. Gay and Fisher, 
Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter XV: Part 5. 
98 “CPI Inflation Calculator,” United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed April 20, 
2015, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter XV: Part 5. 
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$8,802 and $917 in 2015 dollars—respectively, signifying the import of the affluent to 
the effort (see Appendix B, Figures I and II).99 Each share looks and reads like a 
prototypical stockholder certificate, “[certifying] that” the buyer is now “the owner of... 
shares of the preferred stock of Belgian Kiddies, Ltd.” (see Appendix B, Figures I and II). 
The shares also appear to showcase the organization’s logo: a bald eagle underlining the 
phrase “Incorporated Under the Laws of Humanity” (see Appendix B, Figures I and II). 
But lest its owner forget that Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. is in the strict business of charity, the 
certificates reminds that “each share... gives one meal per day for one year to a Belgian 
child. No cash dividend will ever be paid, and the stock is fully assessable” (see 
Appendix B, Figures I and II). 
 b. Import of Documents to Upper Class Mobilization 
 Like Hoover’s address to the Rocky Mountain Club, the Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. 
stock exemplifies the judicious tactics by which the CRB appealed to the predilections of 
the American upper class. By borrowing the corporate model for its fundraising efforts, 
the Commission shrewdly marketed itself and its virtuous cause to an audience well 
versed in the art of stockholding. Moreover, the semantics of “humanity” integrated into 
the shares were in keeping with the secular discourse of the times—likely pronounced in 
elite, educated circles—“that spoke less of charity” in traditional Christian terms “and 
more about human rights.”100 Lastly, the bald eagle featured on the certificates further 
evoked Hoover’s claim that the CRB was “America’s greatest exhibit in Europe,” 
highlighting for the upper class the economic implications of the Commission’s efforts. 
99 “CPI Inflation Calculator,” United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
100 Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 4. 
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 A preponderance of evidence suggests that Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. ultimately 
proved valuable. With the financial assistance of mining engineers such as the Mudds, it 
was able to muster $85,000 by May 1, 1917.101 The fact that Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. 
continued its campaign after the United States’ declaration of war on Germany on April 
6, 1917 was also significant—as will be discussed in Chapter 3. This rendered their 
enterprise uniquely durable. Finally, it appears that at least in some instances, Belgian 
Kiddies, Ltd. was able to expand beyond its established upper class subscriber base and 
secure the backing of middle class individuals. On February 2, 1917, Seeley W. Mudd 
sent a letter with attachments to Professor F. B. Brackett—the first professor of Pomona 
College and an American delegate of the CRB—informing him of Belgian Kiddies, 
Ltd.’s efforts (see Appendix B, Figure III).102 This message apparently spurred Professor 
Brackett into action: leaflets attributed to him were soon disseminated throughout his 
neighborhood, which secured more modest contributions of $1 per month for one year 
(see Appendix B, Figure IV). The American middle class ultimately played a large part in 
the CRB’s success, but it was not on account of the Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. campaign; 
rather, CRB materials appealing to the middle class’s Progressive proclivities—as well as 
rumors of wartime atrocities committed against Belgian children—were more responsible 
for their introduction to the relief movement fold. 
101 Kellogg, Fighting Starvation in Belgium, 105. 
102 Frank Parkhurst Brackett, History of Pomona Valley, California, with Biographical 
Sketches of The Leading Men and Women of the Valley Who Have Been Identified With 
Its Growth and Development from the Early Days to the Present (Los Angeles: Historic 
Record Company, 1920), 197-257. 
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Chapter 2: Mobilizing the Middle Class 
The unqualified achievement of the CRB was also predicated on its successful 
mobilization of American middle class support—a fact most clearly reflected by its 
charity apparatus. In the early days of the movement, while he still “believed that the 
CRB could be run [entirely] as a charitable undertaking,” Hoover “telegraphed the 
Governors of the... States asking them to establish committees of responsible men and 
women to collect money and commodities for relief.”103 This led to the formation of 
thousands of regional subcommittees “in each state which maintained a direct contact 
with the New York office of the CRB.”104 The majority of these subcommittees were 
exceedingly local in character; for instance, Southern California maintained standing 
subcommittees in the then-sleepy suburban hamlets of Claremont, Pasadena, Santa 
Barbara, and Redlands.105 Individually, these subcommittees rarely assembled 
astonishing gifts, and the Claremont committee—Southern California’s most charitable 
subcommittee—only managed to donate $4,952.83 during the course of the First World 
War.106 The aggregate of the American subcommittees’ donations, on the other hand, 
mustered a much more impressive figure—$34.5 million of the $52.3 million 
103 Burner, Herbert Hoover, 80. Hoover, An American Epic, Volume 1, 30. 
104 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter 
XV: Introduction. 
105 Ibid., Chapter XV: Part 8. 
106 Ibid. 
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international total—that required the financial backing of untold scores of Americans.107 
Ultimately, as noted by Vernon Kellogg—a prominent CRB official—“The great 
majority of the gifts made to the Commission through State committees or through 
special fund [organizations], or directly to the New York office, [came] in small sums 
coming from millions of individuals.”108 
This information suggests that Hoover’s complaints about “failed” appeals were 
poorly founded. While there are admittedly no statistics that properly portray the exact 
distribution between upper class and middle class contributions in the CRB’s charity 
fund, the humble character of the American subcommittees, the verifiable mode of small-
size donations, and the sheer number of philanthropic contributors all suggest that a 
galvanized middle class played an integral role in shoring up the CRB. Key artifacts from 
the Mudd Family Papers ultimately elucidate how the Commission mobilized the 
American middle class: A Plea for One Million Belgian Children demonstrates that CRB 
appeals harnessed the American middle class’s Progressive predilections, while the 
Letters from Helen C. Foote illustrate that wartime rumors—particularly of German 
atrocities against Belgian children—augmented its efforts. 
I. A Plea for One Million Belgian Children 
a. Survey of Pertinent Document Features 
Unlike the artifacts analyzed in the previous chapter, A Plea for One Million 
Belgian Children was an undeniable appeal to the pathos of the American middle class. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Kellogg, Fighting Starvation in Belgium, 106-7. 
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Because the pamphlet was printed in English by the CRB’s New York City branch—the 
locus of Belgian relief efforts in North America—and addressed to the “American 
people” by name, it is axiomatic that the document was produced for American 
consumption (see Appendix C, Figures I and IV). Moreover, while high enough to 
preclude many lower class workers from donating, the suggested pledge of $1 per 
month—which represents about $22 in 2015 currency—paled in comparison to other 
types of CRB fundraising, such as the aforementioned Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stocks sold 
at $12 per share to elite mining engineers.109 This means that A Plea for One Million 
Belgian Children was indubitably disseminated for the purpose of garnering donations 
from the American middle class.  
Although the five-page pamphlet reads largely like an abridged company report, it 
is nonetheless replete with an inescapable air of pathos. The cover sets the tone of A Plea 
for One Million Belgian Children by integrating a quote from Maurice Maeterlinck, an 
eminent Belgian writer, who laments the plight of the one million Belgian children “who 
for two years have not eaten according to their hunger” (see Appendix C, Figure I). After 
recapitulating the CRB’s founding under the leadership of Herbert Hoover and 
championing the $173,658,913 in food and clothing imported into Belgium prior to the 
pamphlet’s publication, the third page warns that higher food costs and a “pressing need 
for an extra ration to the children” necessitates $10,000,000 to be raised in the upcoming 
year; anything “less than this sum will mean hunger and sickness” for the Belgian 
children (see Appendix C, Figures II and III). 
109 “CPI Inflation Calculator,” United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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The final two pages validate this “pressing need for an extra ration to the 
children”—one million of them, to be exact—by explaining that malnourishment has 
engendered a host of ills in Belgium. First, the pamphlet reports that the status quo ration 
“had proved inadequate over a prolonged period, and, more particularly, had failed to 
provide the necessary nourishment for growing children, their power of resistance being 
in consequence greatly impaired” (see Appendix C, Figure IV). Shortly thereafter, the 
pamphlet notes, “There was an alarming increase in tuberculosis and certain other 
diseases, particularly among children, and that this was clearly due to malnutrition” (see 
Appendix C, Figure IV). A Plea for One Million Belgian Children finally rests its case 
and “[asks] the American people to assume [the] responsibility” of providing 
supplementary meals to Belgian children by contributing donations at the “cost of one 
dollar per month for each child” (see Appendix C, Figure IV). In order to do so, the CRB 
breaks the fourth wall: “The requirements have been simply and concisely stated. The 
need is urgent and irresistible. What is your answer?” (see Appendix C, Figure IV). 
Underscoring the moral imperative of the pamphlet, the back makes a parting appeal to 
pathos with an emblazoned image of a young boy, presumably Belgian, saluting and 
thanking readers for their pledges (see Appendix C, Figure VI). 
b. Overview of Middle Class Progressivism 
A Plea for One Million Belgian Children’s manifest emphasis on moral duty and 
child welfare fit squarely within the foremost concerns of the turn-of-the-twentieth-
century, middle class Progressives. The prevailing mores of the Progressive Era were 
profoundly informed by the works and ideologies of eminent American philanthropists, 
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such as Carnegie and Rockefeller, who conceived private, charitable foundations as a 
medium to pool their capital and promote basic social welfare and cultural maintenance; 
however, according to Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, “the creators of the great 
foundations,” most notably Carnegie and Rockefeller, “were not ‘Progressives,’ either 
politically or intellectually.”110 This was because the thrust of the Progressive 
Movement—despite taking cues from the charitable tendencies of elite philanthropists—
was animated by an American middle class whose views only variably aligned with 
theirs. 
The middle class of the time approximately “[ranked] below the ‘upper 10 
percent,’ as the wealthy were often called, but above the struggling working classes,” and 
“comprised small businesspeople and bureaucrats, independent farmers and urban 
professionals, white-collar workers and teachers, clerks and small manufacturers.”111 
Shelton Stromquist posits that the American middle class spearheaded the Progressive 
Movement as a reaction to the myriad social ills begotten by the Industrial Revolution 
and the resultant “battles between labor and capital” in the late nineteenth century.112 In 
order to resolve class conflict, the middle class emphasized “class harmony,” which 
would be achieved by protecting “the people” and “the common good as a social ideal” 
by eradicating “corrupting influences, represented by urban boss rule and corporate 
110 Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 20-9. Barry D. Karl 
and Stanley N. Katz, “The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public 
Sphere 1890-1930,” in Minerva 19, no. 2 (Summer 1981): 253. 
111 James Marten, Childhood and Child Welfare in the Progressive Era: A Brief History 
with Documents (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2005), 6. 
112 Shelton Stromquist, Reinventing “The People”: The Progressive Movement, the Class 
Problem, and the Origins of Modern Liberalism (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
2006), 3. 
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‘robber barons.’”113 Progressive social reformers “[embraced] the idea that industrial 
progress, organized by capitalist property holders, would produce prosperity and alleviate 
misery.”114 The middle class sympathized with the plight of the marginalized working 
class, a stance that differentiated them from industrialists like Carnegie and Rockefeller, 
who “both... fought against [organized labor] with the kind of brutality many in their 
position considered appropriate.”115 The consensus that industry and capital could help 
fuel palpable social reform opened a crucial gap for nascent coalitions between the upper 
and middle classes to take full form. 
Middle class Progressives also understood social dissonance to be a product of 
moral decay on both the upper and lower ends of the socioeconomic spectrum: on the one 
hand, they rebuked elite capitalists and their “contempt for traditional family values,” as 
they “divorced regularly,” “exiled their children to boarding schools,” and propped up 
institutions that deprived children of their innocence—including child labor.116 On the 
other hand, they perceived the working poor, beset by “debased lifestyles,” as “victims of 
ignorance and powerlessness” and in desperate need of proportionate reform.117 
“No crusade tapped the moral outrage” of middle class Progressives, however, 
“more deeply than the campaign to abolish child labor.”118 To them, “[children] 
represented all that was good about the country, and the way they were treated reflected 
113 Ibid., 3-5. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Karl and Katz, “The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public 
Sphere 1890-1930,” 253. 
116 Marten, Childhood and Child Welfare in the Progressive Era, 6. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Stromquist, Reinventing “The People,” 93. 
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the nation’s values and priorities.”119 Yet the mores of the United States appeared to be in 
a state of disarray: middle class Americans were unsurprisingly aghast at sociologist 
Lewis Hine’s widely publicized photographs, which vividly depicted the excruciating 
plight of child laborers—all at a time when child labor accounted for “a staggering 30 
percent of the work force in southern textile mills.”120 The child welfare-focused 
concerns of the American middle class were also shaped by the works of Florence 
Kelley, a prominent children’s advocate, who in 1905 “set the tone for Progressive child 
welfare reformers” by declaring for “all humans... ‘a right to childhood.’”121 Kelley and 
her colleagues’ writings became the foundations of the League of Nations’ “Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child”; issued in 1924, it enumerated not only the right of children 
“to be educated to a trade, and be protected from economic exploitation,” but also “to 
develop materially and spiritually; to be fed, nursed, disciplined, and sheltered; [and] to 
be the first to receive help in times of crisis.”122 The American middle class consequently 
became exceedingly sensitive to child welfare issues—rendering “child welfare [as] the 
issue that most Progressives could agree on.”123 
For many middle class Americans, then, the cause of Belgian relief represented a 
moral crusade that necessitated intervention by their own wherewithal—even at a time 
when the United States was officially neutral in the war itself. There are a multitude of 
anecdotes that point to the salience and moral imperative of the Belgian relief movement 
to middle class America; for example, Kellogg’s book cites “a druggist in a small town in 
119 Marten, Childhood and Child Welfare in the Progressive Era, 3. 
120 Stromquist, Reinventing “The People,” 93-5. 
121 Marten, Childhood and Child Welfare in the Progressive Era, 88. 
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Indiana [who] sent one dollar a week for more than two years” and “a country grocer 
[who] sent, each week, a fixed percentage of his profit.”124 Clearly, the CRB’s mission 
and the middle class’ values intersected—making the middle class a valuable resource for 
the CRB’s charity campaigns. 
c. Import of Document to Middle Class Mobilization 
A Plea for One Million Belgian Children, then, evinces that the CRB employed 
the language and themes of Progressivism to successfully mobilize the American middle 
class. By addressing the pamphlet to “the American people,” the CRB deliberately 
appealed to the middle class ideal of a society bereft of class conflict and united by a 
yearning for the “common good”—which, in this particular case, meant relief for Belgian 
children. Moreover, by limning the malaise and malnourishment of Belgian children, 
forewarning the dangers of failed action, and deeming relief for Belgian children the 
“responsibility” of Americans, the CRB made an appeal to pathos that artfully established 
the rectitude of Belgian relief. The rhetoric of moral responsibility—predicated on the 
Progressive mission to allay social discord through moral harmony—was unquestionably 
salient to the relief movement: it can even be found in other CRB pamphlets not included 
in the Mudd Family Papers, such as “A Million a Month to Save Belgium’s Hungry 
Children,” which argued that “America and America alone can avert the ultimate, 
unthinkable tragedy which the failure of the Commission’s finances would mean to 
Belgium.”125 Finally, A Plea for One Million Belgian Children’s wholesale concern for 
child welfare reflects a shared objective that easily coalesced the energies of both upper 
124 Kellogg, Fighting Starvation in Belgium, 108. 
125 Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 173. 
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and middle classes: on the one hand, relief for Belgian children comported with the ideals 
of elite philanthropists who placed a premium on fulfilling the basic needs of the utterly 
destitute; and on the other hand, the middle class had no qualms acting on their child 
welfare-oriented impulses—which, as expressed in the “Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child,” entailed securing the right of all children “to be fed... and sheltered” and “to be 
the first to receive help in times of crisis.”126 
From the opening quote to the parting image of the saluting Belgian boy, A Plea 
for One Million Belgian Children demonstrates how the CRB successfully utilized the 
motifs and rhetoric of Progressivism to enlist the American middle class’s support. This 
strategy was key for the upper class to gain the unqualified trust and financial backing of 
a middle class that already perceived capital—when exercised by “moral” persons—as a 
handy tool for enacting social reform. Yet an important development outside the CRB’s 
control also leant urgency to its appeals to child welfare and the rectitude of protecting 
Belgian children: rumors about wartime atrocities against Belgian children. The Letters 
from Helen C. Foote show that an especially outlandish rumor—German soldiers 
amputating Belgian children’s hands—informed and animated the American middle class 
to the advantage of the Commission. 
 
 
 
126 Marten, Childhood and Child Welfare in the Progressive Era, 88. 
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II. Letters from Helen C. Foote  
a. Survey of Pertinent Document Features 
Helen C. Foote was born on January 29, 1880 in South Bend, Indiana.127 She was 
the second of four children born to William Alexis Foote—a “farmer, merchant and flour 
[miller]”—and Florence E. Frazier.128 At the time she composed her letter, Foote was a 
thirty-seven-year-old teacher “in the Evansville High School” who “[had] just received 
[her] A.M. degree from Indiana University” (see Appendix D, Figures II and III). A 
variety of graduate registries from Indiana University corroborate her academic 
credentials: she received her A.B. in English from Indiana University in 1912 and her 
A.M.—also in English and from Indiana University—on October 27, 1916.129 In 1919, 
she penned a sardonic article espousing textbook reform in a journal for educators, which 
lists her position as an “Assistant in the English Department” at Evansville, Indiana’s 
Central High School.130 In the letter itself, Foote divulges her salary at “$1,250.00 a 
year”—which in 2015 currency represents approximately $22,922 (see Appendix D, 
Figure II).131 In sum, the evidence of her personal history supports one undeniable 
conclusion: Foote was a prototypical educated, professional, and reform-minded middle 
class American with a critical eye on the conditions of children. 
127 Abram W. Foote, The Foote History and Genealogy (Rutland, Vermont: Marble City 
Press - The Tuttle Company, 1907), 497. 
128 Ibid., 497-8. 
129 “Catalog for 1913,” in Indiana University Bulletin 11, no. 5 (1913): 355-400. “Catalog 
for 1917,” in Indiana University Bulletin 15, no. 10 (1917): 249-272. “Register of 
Graduates,” in Indiana University Bulletin 15, no. 12 (1917): 214. 
130 Helen C. Foote, “Our Text Books,” in The Educator-Journal 20, no. 2 (1919): 78-9.  
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Her letters to the CRB indicate that she was strongly informed by sensational tales 
of barbarisms surrounding the German occupation of Belgium. Addressed to the “Belgian 
Relief Commission” on June 8, 1917, Foote’s first letter explains her purpose candidly: “I 
wish to adopt a little Belgian boy of six years of age” (see Appendix D, Figure I). She 
proceeds to enumerate a litany of preferences for her adoptee, including the qualification 
that she receives “a bright intelligent blonde child, who is handsome and high bred in 
appearance”; nevertheless, in the letter’s sole underlined sentence, Foote emphatically 
specifies her chief requirement: “Also 
I desire you select him from the number of those children whose right hands are cut off” 
(see Appendix D, Figure I). After disclosing her biographical information, Foote 
concludes her letter by illuminating a key reason for her intention to rear a Belgian boy: 
“I wish a boy; because I wish to bring him up to avenge Belgium, if the occasion ever 
arises, when Germany must be beaten a second time” (see Appendix D, Figure III). 
Foote received a “prompt answer”—ostensibly from William L. Honnold or a 
CRB official representing him—and responded on June 10 (see Appendix D, Figures IV 
and VI). In this second letter, she expresses her gladness of learning that the CRB “[does] 
not know of any children mutilated by the Germans”—a revelation that allows her to 
“hate the Germans... a little more calmly” and ceases her desire to see “the extermination 
of the whole race” (see Appendix D, Figures IV and V). Foote then explains how she 
came to accept the rumors: 
My belief in the existence of mutilated children was based upon the Bryce report 
(or rather what others have told me of it); the cartoons of Raemakers [sic]; and 
“Belgium’s Agony,” that by Verhaeren. I still believe that these two men, at least, 
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might be telling the truth; but I certainly do not believe all that I read in the 
newspapers (see Appendix D, Figure V). 
 
Notwithstanding the demise of her adoption plans, Foote pledges to support the CRB 
financially: “Since my plan to adopt an orphan in the flesh does not seem practical; I 
shall, a little later on, contribute monthly to the support of some Belgian child. The Little 
Theater Company here, to which I belong, may contribute to the support of several more. 
A few of us are urging this plan very strongly” (see Appendix D, Figures V and VI). 
b. Overview of the “Rape of Belgium” 
 At first glance, Foote’s insistence that she adopt a Belgian boy with an amputated 
right hand may seem perplexing and disturbing; but as her second letter reveals, her plans 
were greatly informed by popular myths of ghastly German atrocities during the 
occupation of Belgium—collectively referred to as the “Rape of Belgium.” Like many 
modern myths, the “Rape of Belgium” was founded on a critical element of truth. During 
the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), “58,000 French irregulars were organized into so-
called corps-francs” with the purpose of “[harassing] the enemy communication lines and 
[attacking] isolated pockets of German troops.”132 These soldiers often battled sans 
uniforms and camouflaged themselves by blending into the civilian population.133 After 
the war, the corps-francs—despite only accounting for “no more than 1,000 German 
132 James Hayward, Myths & Legends of the First World War (Stroud, England: Sutton 
Publishing, 2002), 70. 
133 Ibid. 
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casualties”—were remembered in Germany as “villainous murderers, or franc-tireurs”—
which in French translates to “free shooter.”134 
During the invasion of Belgium a mere forty-three years later, the threat of franc-
tireurs stymieing the Kaiser’s forces emerged as one of the foremost concerns of German 
commanders.135 Certified anecdotes from the era confirm that these fears were only 
partly founded, as there was “a certain amount of sporadic and uncoordinated partisan 
activity by Belgian civilians and civil guards”; nevertheless, rumors began circulating 
amongst Germans of unspeakable crimes perpetrated by franc-tireurs in collaboration 
with the larger Belgian citizenry.136 An excerpt from the German newspaper, Kolnische 
Volkzeitung, offers an example of a wild yet typical account of Belgian barbarity: “It is 
proven beyond a doubt that German wounded were robbed and killed by the Belgian 
population and indeed were subject to horrible mutilations, and that even women and 
young girls took part in these shameful actions. In this way, the eyes of German soldiers 
were torn out, their ears, noses, fingers, and sexual organs cut off or their body cut 
open.”137  
The specter of the franc-tireurs prompted the German army and government to 
adopt a “premeditated campaign of Schrecklichkeit, or frightfulness, against Belgian 
civilians.”138 This policy specifically entailed “the wholesale destruction of property and 
134 Ibid. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A Global History, 15. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Hayward, Myths and Legends of the First World War, 71-4. 
137 Ibid., 74. 
138 Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 15. 
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the execution of civilian hostages.”139 One of the starkest—and most tragic—examples of 
Schrecklichkeit’s gruesome efficacy was the infamous “Sacking of Louvain.” The 
German army took over the city peacefully on August 19, 1914; but on August 25, “an 
attack by Belgian forces from Antwerp against German positions near Louvain triggered 
a mild panic amongst the troops in the city, and allegations of franc-tireur activity” ran 
amok accordingly.140 The next day, the German military governor of Brussels, General 
von Luttwitz, fabricated a story that “the German commandant in Louvain had been shot 
by the son of the town mayor” as a pretext for sacking the city.141 German soldiers soon 
commenced a five-day slaughter, “[breaking] down doors, [hauling] people out, and 
either [shooting] them or [sending] them to the train station, where a firing squad or 
detention awaited.”142 The houses of “suspected” franc-tireurs were also set aflame.143 
The Germans later eviscerated Louvain of its cultural treasures: “They set fire to the 
university’s library, destroying the precious buildings and the irreplaceable Gothic and 
Renaissance manuscripts contained within.”144 In the wake of the madness, “more than a 
thousand homes in Louvain proper” had been destroyed—accounting for “one-seventh of 
the housing stock”—and corpses of Belgians and horses littered Louvain’s streets.145  
While German forces were undoubtedly culpable for a slew of war crimes, 
including the Sacking of Louvain, the governments and press of the Allied countries 
139 Hayward, Myths & Legends of the First World War, 72. 
140 Ibid., 75-6. 
141 Ibid., 76. 
142 Larry Zuckerman, The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I (New 
York: New York University Press, 2004), 31. 
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War, 76. 
                                                          
  50 
 
seized upon the panic to propagate exaggerated reports of “Hun” depravities for 
propaganda purposes.146 A number of these unsubstantiated, “generic” stories tended to 
underscore the violent lechery of German soldiers; as a result, the collective experience 
of the German occupation of Belgium came to be known as the “Rape of Belgium.”147  
One of the more outlandish rumors that surfaced during the “Rape of Belgium” 
was the Germans’ sordid penchant for capriciously amputating the hands of Belgian 
children.148 An early account of this “certainly untrue” wantonness came from Major A. 
Corbett-Smith, a British Expeditionary Force (BEF) officer who later became a “prolific 
author”: “Hanging up in the open window of a shop, strung from a hook in the cross-
beam, like a joint in a butcher’s shop, was the body of a little girl, five years old, perhaps. 
Its poor little hands had been hacked off, and through the slender body were vicious 
bayonet stabs.”149 Around this time, the image of the savage Hun amputating the hands of 
Belgian children became a favorite motif employed by Allied propagandists.150 
Foote was correct to cite the eminent Belgian poet, Emile Verhaeren, as a 
purveyor of the rumor: in Belgium’s Agony, he remarked that German soldiers thoroughly 
enjoyed mutilating Belgian children, who “[had] little hands that [were] delightfully easy 
to cut off.”151 Louis Raemaekers, the famous Dutch artist, was another likely culprit for 
146 Hayward, Myths & Legends of the First World War, 77-8. 
147 Ibid, 79-84. 
148 Ibid., 81. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid., Photographs: Figure 15. 
151 Emile Verhaeren, Belgium's Agony (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915), 32 
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his harrowing depictions of suffering in German occupied territories.152 No work did 
more to validate the myth, however, than the “infamous” Bryce Report.153 Representing 
the findings of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages—an investigative 
commission organized by the British government and chaired by Lord James Bryce—it 
“confirmed” the veracity of some of the most grotesque accounts of German debauchery 
in Belgium, including the sensational hand amputation rumor.154 The report was 
published a mere seven days subsequent to the sinking of the Lusitania, was translated 
into thirty languages, and was sold at the thrifty “price of a newspaper”; this confluence 
of factors made it “an immediate bestseller” with “a critical influence on public 
opinion.”155 
In retrospect, scholars have widely interpreted the Bryce Report as a “hugely 
flawed” document shoddily constructed on hearsay and deficient methods of inquiry.156 
Prior to the report’s publication, in fact, “Bryce himself had been warned that no children 
with amputated hands had been seen or heard of at any of six given addresses in 
London.”157 Nevertheless, fictitious narratives—such as the hand amputation rumor—
survived in the Allies’ collective consciousness, informing the worldviews and decisions 
of the public, including Foote. 
 
152 Louis Raemaekers, Raemaekers' Cartoons: With Accompanying Notes by Well-Known 
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c. Import of Documents to Middle Class Mobilization 
 Foote’s letters aptly illustrate the salience of wartime rumors to the CRB and its 
successful mobilization of the middle class. The Commission officially subscribed to a 
policy of refraining from “hysterical exaggeration” in its public statements—but it 
nevertheless capitalized on tall tales emanating from Belgium.158 Like many educated 
middle class Americans, Foote encountered largely true reports of German war crimes in 
Belgium—such as the campaign of Schrecklichkeit and the Sacking of Louvain—in 
ordinary newspapers; however, since the veracity of published reports ran the gamut, 
Foote and other middle class Americans were equally predisposed to reading spurious 
narratives, such as those in Belgium’s Agony and the Bryce Report, which “verified” 
accounts of German troops indiscriminately amputating the hands of Belgian children. 
Foote’s passionate desire to rear a Belgian boy and “avenge Belgium” in another war 
with Germany indicates that these sensational rumors—absorbed as facts when blended 
in the press with real war crimes—seem to have tapped into the proclivities of the child 
welfare-minded middle class, inciting a collective moral indignation and determination to 
support efforts to suppress child abuse. Ultimately, as evidenced by the conclusion of her 
second letter, the American middle class converted this anger into palpable financial 
contributions, answering the CRB’s appeals. 
As aforementioned, the CRB’s historic fund—built on the donations of both the 
American upper and middle classes—was key to the movement’s success, “[providing] 
invaluable support before government subsidies were granted” by the United States and 
158 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter 
XV: Part 5. 
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demonstrating “the strength of the world-wide moral support of the undertaking, which 
[became] an important factor in securing government assistance”; nonetheless, rumors 
suggesting the Commission’s demise after the United States’ declaration of war on 
Germany threatened to put a halt to these loans and derail the entire enterprise itself.159 
The following documents elucidate how the CRB combatted these rumors and 
maintained the American public’s support for the purpose of renewing United States 
government loans—the new primary source of CRB funding. 
159 Ibid., Chapter XV: Introduction. 
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Chapter 3: Responding to the United States’ Entry into World War I 
 On June 4, 1917, Harvey S. Mudd—a reliable supporter of Belgian Kiddies, 
Ltd.—messaged the organization to announce his cancellation of regular financial 
contributions: “I have recently read the statement made by Mr. Hoover saying that the 
Government had undertaken the work of Belgian relief. There are many other calls for 
donations and under the circumstances I think it best to discontinue my contribution of 
$50.00 monthly” (see Appendix E, Figure I). Eight days later, he received a reply from 
John V. N. Dorr, chairman of the Belgian Kiddies Committee, beseeching him to 
reconsider: 
I am enclosing herewith circular recently sent out by the Commission for Belgian 
Relief regarding the change in conditions caused by the United States making a 
loan to France and Belgium sufficient to purchase all the food that can be 
transported. Although the urgency of the need is thus removed, the fact that the 
sums being advanced are loans and not gifts and that Mr. Hoover, Mr. Honnold 
and the other American Engineers connected with the work will continue to give 
their services without pay makes it seem right that we should continue our efforts 
to raise the Belgian Relief Fund to the amount originally proposed, $120,000... 
Our entrance into the war can only give us a greater appreciation of and sympathy 
for those who have suffered so much (see Appendix E, Figure II). 
 
On July 25—apparently believing Dorr’s letter and attachment had been sent on July 7—
Mudd responded, emphatically acknowledging that the materials had prompted him to 
change his mind: “The monthly amount which I have been sending was discontinued 
because I understood from various sources that the contributions were no longer desired. 
Under the circumstances I shall be very glad to renew any help which I am able to give 
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until the amount raised by the American Engineers reaches $120,000. I enclose herewith 
check for $50.00 for the month of August (see Appendix E, Figure V). 
The correspondence between Mudd and Dorr underscores a pivotal moment in the 
history of the CRB: the United States’ entry into the First World War. This event not only 
transformed the political and military parameters of the entire conflict, but also 
compelled the CRB to recalibrate its organization, financing, and objectives—and in 
doing so, prompted rumors claiming the Commission’s demise. The “circular” forwarded 
by Dorr—a letter from Hoover to the CRB’s supporters—reveals how the organization 
addressed these misconceptions in order to maintain the American public’s support for 
the purpose of renewing vital government loans. Ultimately, the outcome of the Mudd-
Dorr correspondence, as well as the CRB’s successful acquisition of renewed loans, 
suggests that the Commission indeed retained this support subsequent to the United 
States’ entry—a factor that likely contributed to the movement’s overall success. 
I. Herbert Hoover: To Supporters of the Commission for Relief in Belgium – May 25, 
1917 
a. Survey of Pertinent Document Features 
 The letter is addressed to the “Supporters of the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium” in the United States—a liberal classification likely encompassing the entire 
gamut of American social groups that propped up the movement. Dated at May 25, 1917, 
it was composed and first disseminated shortly after the United States’ declaration of war 
on Germany on April 6, 1917. The piece is attributed to Hoover, and although it is 
difficult to verify whether or not he penned it personally, it nonetheless appears to be an 
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official CRB document—meaning he almost certainly endorsed its message. Hoover 
begins by making a stunning proclamation regarding the CRB’s funding: 
We are sure that the American people will be glad to know that through the 
sympathetic arrangements made by the President and the Secretary of Treasury, 
the cost of the relief of Belgium and the occupied territories of Northern France... 
will be borne for the next six months by the American Government. This has been 
made possible by a loan of $75,000,000 from the United States to the 
Governments of Belgium and France. The money will be advanced by the 
Treasury in installments of $12,500,000 per month, of which $7,500,000 will be 
available for Belgian relief and $5,000,000 for the relief in the occupied portion 
of Northern France. The way is open so that at the termination of the six months 
thus provided for, application may be made to the Government for further loans 
(see Appendix E, Figure III). 
 
He explains that the CRB’s public appeals played a key role in this achievement, and that 
their efficacy ultimately “insured” the continuation of the relief movement: 
We feel that the sympathy with our work and the support of the public have 
largely influenced the Government in finally granting the request of the Belgian 
and French Governments. Therefore our appeals have done more than to bring in 
immediate contributions; they have helped to insure the relief of Belgium and 
Northern France throughout the war (see Appendix E, Figure III). 
 
Hoover believes that the “whole American nation” should feel “intense satisfaction” on 
account of the CRB being “firmly established as a distinctly American undertaking”; 
nonetheless, Hoover notes that the United States’ loan of “$12,500,000 per month is 
much less than the amount which [the CRB has] stated as necessary to supply the imports 
required” (see Appendix E, Figure III). This is because the new figure “will now cover all 
of the foodstuffs that we can hope to ship owing to the recent swiftly developed shortage 
of the world’s shipping” (see Appendix E, Figure III). 
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Immediately afterwards, Hoover forcefully clarifies that the CRB will continue to 
be the sole official conveyor of international relief to Belgium and Northern France: “It 
must be clearly understood that the Commission for Relief in Belgium will continue 
to assume the entire charge of purchasing and transporting all food into Belgium 
and Northern France (occupied portion). The Commission also will continue to be 
the only fully regularized vehicle by which money, food, and clothing can be sent 
into Belgium” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). In a similar vein, he adds that the CRB’s 
“Commercial Exchange Department will continue as heretofore to effect transfers of 
money into Belgium” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). Hoover then outlines the process by 
which “individuals or committees outside of Belgium” can utilize this department to 
“send money to relatives or friends... [or] any of the specially deserving internal 
charities” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). According to Hoover, “Over $5,000,000 has been 
transferred in this way since the belligerent governments gave their official sanction to 
the operations of this department” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). 
 In a radical departure from its previous strategies, Hoover pledges that the CRB 
will eschew public appeals upon receipt of the loans: “The Government payments will 
commence on June 1st; and we shall be glad to have remittances up to that date, but we 
make no appeal for contributions thereafter” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). 
Notwithstanding this reversal, he assures that the beneficiaries of these prior appeals—
“the children of Belgium”—will continue to “have the first call upon all food which is 
imported, and every effort will be made to maintain the supplementary meal which has 
been so important a factor up to the present in sustaining the health of millions of 
children” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). Nevertheless, Hoover warns that the CRB will not 
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be precluded from resuming public appeals in the future: “Although the general relief of 
the countries involved will now be met by the Government appropriations, 
emergencies and special conditions may arise which could only be met by private 
donations. In such circumstances I hope that we may again call on you to help meet 
the demands of the situation, whatever that may be” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). 
Hoover concludes by promising that continued donations to the CRB will be well spent: 
“Should any contributors desire to continue their gifts, notwithstanding the present 
position, they may be assured that their contributions will be expended sooner or 
later to great advantage, either during or after the war” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). 
b. Overview of the United States’ Entry and its Ramifications 
 As evidenced by Hoover’s letter, the United States’ entry into the First World 
War marked a new phase in the relief movement of Belgium and Northern France. For 
the better part of the past century, historians have belabored the reasons that brought the 
United States and Germany into armed conflict; but one of the key factors that uniquely 
affected the CRB involved Germany’s disruption of international shipping. On account of 
its anti-colonial sentiments, business concerns, and domestic ethnic divisions, the United 
States remained diplomatically neutral for much of the war; as a result, the belligerent 
countries were content to grant the CRB—staffed largely by Americans—neutral status 
itself.160 According to Gay and Fisher, the CRB’s “neutral status was the essential 
condition of the Commission's existence as a body recognized and supported by the 
belligerents and endowed by them with privileges and immunities which permitted its 
160 de Groot, The First World War, 112-3. Burner, Herbert Hoover, 74. 
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operations within and across the opposing lines.”161 Of course, one of these core 
“privileges and immunities” enabled Americans to work for the CRB within occupied 
Belgium and Northern France.162 CRB officials understood, however, that the fate of the 
entire enterprise was inherently tenuous, “[reasonably assuming] that [the CRB losing] its 
neutrality would cause either the replacement of the Commission by another body of 
neutral membership or the discontinuance of relief.”163 
Hoover was rightly anxious about the prospect of a German-American conflict 
subsequent to Germany’s sinking of RMS Lusitania on May 7, 1915, but events in early 
1917 forced him and the CRB to begin preparing for this nearly inexorable eventuality.164 
After months of indiscriminate U-boat strikes and mine deployments by Germany had 
froze German-American relations and sharply reduced trans-Atlantic shipping, Germany 
compounded the situation when it declared unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 
1917.165 On February 3—the same day President Woodrow Wilson terminated 
diplomatic relations with Germany—a CRB ship named the Euphrates was torpedoed, 
leaving only one survivor.166 This tragedy exacted a profound emotional toll on Hoover, 
and in its wake, the CRB swiftly halted all of its shipping services and commenced talks 
to hand its operations over to Dutch and Spanish authorities—both representing neutral 
countries.167 CRB overseas deliveries fell precipitously from 90,019 tons in January to 
161 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter 
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10,116 tons in March.168 In total, the CRB lost seven ships to torpedoes and two to mines 
during Germany’s campaign of unlimited submarine warfare.169 The CRB’s decision to 
cease shipping, however, had “immediate results”: “German authorities in Belgium, not 
wishing to be responsible for the discontinuance of relief, promptly reversed themselves 
and declared that the Americans might remain in the occupied territories, exercising the 
same privileges that they had hitherto enjoyed.”170 Consequently, CRB shipping resumed 
cautiously on February 24.171 Germany’s submarine campaign nonetheless continued 
unabated, and by April 6, President Wilson had requested and received an official 
declaration of war from Congress.172 
This seismic political event yielded an extraordinary reconstitution of the CRB’s 
organization, funding, and objectives. In order to preserve its neutral status, the CRB 
immediately recalled its American workers in occupied Belgium and Northern France, 
replacing them with Spanish and Dutch personnel; however, the entirety of the CRB’s 
operations outside these areas continued to be directed and executed by the Americans.173 
This became the CRB’s modus operandi for the remainder of the war.174 Furthermore, as 
duly noted by Hoover’s letter, the CRB successfully secured enormous loans from the 
United States government to help finance the enterprise—an achievement Hoover 
credited to the Commission’s ubiquitous public support. After the United States’ entrance 
168 Ibid., 344. 
169 Ibid., 321. 
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into the war, Congress began moving legislation to provide the Allies with large credits, 
as their cumulative “war expenditures had brought them to a desperate financial 
situation.”175 The CRB then lobbied Washington to allocate these credits for the 
Commission.176 On May 17, the CRB was awarded the six-month loan detailed in 
Hoover’s letter—but it came with a crucial congressional stipulation: “all American loans 
had to be spent in the United States.”177 After six months, the United States government 
renewed the award at an increased rate of $9 million per month for Belgium and $6 
million per month for Northern France—and from November 1918 until the CRB’s 
liquidation in March 1919, the United States more than doubled Belgium’s award at $20 
million per month. 
The American loans ultimately revamped the financial structure of the CRB, 
becoming the organization’s primary source of funding: from May 1917 until its 
conclusion in March 1919, the CRB received $386.6 million from the United States 
government—approximately 42% of all receipts accrued through the five-year 
enterprise.178 In contrast, while Britain and France lent a combined $270 million to the 
CRB prior to May 1917, the two countries only provided $43.9 million afterwards.179 The 
introduction of American loans was so transformative that “the [CRB no longer] felt 
justified in calling on the charity of the world for additional money with which to 
175 Gay and Fisher, Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Chapter 
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purchase any food” destined for Europe.180 Potentially on account of this new policy, it 
appears that many Americans began believing “that the American part in the relief of 
Belgium and Northern France ceased with the entrance of [their] country into the war”; 
coincidently, “most organized efforts to raise funds for the [CRB] ceased” subsequent to 
the United States’ declaration of war—yet “a few committees continued to be active until 
the [Armistice].”181 The government loans were nevertheless enough to bring CRB 
shipping rates back to its pre-submarine warfare levels in spite of the decline in 
charity.182 
 c. Import of Document to the Maintenance of Public Support 
  Hoover’s letter to the CRB’s supporters illuminates how the organization, in the 
aftermath of the United States’ declaration of war, attempted to maintain the American 
public’s support for the chief purpose of renewing government loans. By clearly 
expounding its new financial structure and affirming its status as the sole official channel 
of international relief into Belgium and Northern France, the CRB tackled rumors 
suggesting its operations had been entirely turned over to the Spanish and Dutch or the 
United States government—the latter believed by Harvey S. Mudd. Similarly, the 
message conveniently glosses over the prominent role of the Spanish and Dutch in the 
occupied territories, demonstrating that the CRB painted itself—perhaps 
disingenuously—as a more “distinctly American undertaking” on account of the United 
States’ generous loans. The CRB also raised the specter of government loans expiring 
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after six months and suggested that public support would be vital to their renewal—even 
though it vowed to officially refrain from calling on public charity henceforth. But the 
Commission acknowledged that the government loans were insufficient because total 
shipping costs were expected to exceed the government’s monthly allotments—making 
continued financial and moral support all the more necessary. 
The CRB further shored up public support by outlining the process through which 
individuals and the few remaining committees—including Belgian Kiddies, Ltd.—could 
circumvent the congressional stipulation on CRB expenditures and continue providing 
direct monetary support via their exchange commission. The CRB also guaranteed that 
the children of Belgium and Northern France, whose plight had helped mobilize public 
support in the earlier phases of the war, would continue to receive supplementary meals 
and precedence in food distributions. Lastly, while the Commission promised that it 
would only call on public charity when necessitated by emergencies, it also 
acknowledged that continued contributions would be appreciated, assuring donors that 
their money would be well spent in support of the CRB in the United States or directly in 
Belgium and Northern France after the war. The Mudd-Dorr correspondence ultimately 
indicates that the CRB successfully retained the American public’s support by clarifying 
to donors its continued salience and rectitude. Because the CRB eventually secured 
renewed loans—in fact, at higher rates—it is exceedingly likely that the Commission’s 
successful maintenance of public support was instrumental to the achievement of the 
entire relief movement. 
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Conclusion 
 Many of the CRB’s successful public appeals strategies would continue assisting 
humanitarian efforts after the war, finding new life with the American Relief 
Administration (ARA)—an organization that, in several ways, acted as a successor to the 
CRB. In January 1919, while concluding his stints with the CRB and the US Food 
Administration—a wartime government agency formed to export needed agricultural 
products to the European Allies and “encourage Americans to limit their food 
consumption”—Hoover was tapped by President Wilson to head the ARA.183 In its first 
incarnation, the ARA was a “gigantic-government sponsored, humanitarian agency 
supported by thousands of donors” with a mission to feed war-torn Central Europe—
including the United States’ former enemies in Germany and Austria.184 Employing the 
CRB’s proven distribution system as well as its former volunteers, the ARA delivered 
four million tons of food to Central Europe in the nine months following the Armistice, 
rivaling the achievement of the CRB.185 
 Notwithstanding its eventual success, the ARA had to first tackle the considerable 
challenge of mobilizing public support for vanquished enemies—a far greater obstacle to 
fundraising than any faced by the CRB. Yet the ARA—headed by many of the CRB’s 
former leaders, including Hoover—adopted the older public appeals strategies to great 
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effect.186 In a pamphlet entitled “Why We are Feeding Germany?” Hoover argues for the 
economic and diplomatic imperatives of relief, appropriating themes and rhetoric that 
would most easily resonate with elite capitalists and statesmen: 
“From the point of view of an economist, I would say that it is because there are 
seventy millions of people who must either produce or die... their production is 
essential to the world’s future and they... cannot produce unless they are fed. 
From the point of view of a governor... it is because famine breeds anarchy, 
anarchy is infectious, the infection of such a cesspool will jeopardize France and 
Britain, will yet spread to the United States.”187 
 
The pragmatic language applied in this pamphlet likely reflects the character of appeals 
made by Hoover and other ARA officials at posh fundraising dinners, where upper class 
attendees contributed thousands of dollars each.188 The most successful of these events 
was held in New York City; there, the ARA sold 1,000 tickets at $1,000 a piece while 
also raising $1 million in pledges.189 A short time after the dinner, John D. Rockefeller, 
Jr. promised to add $2.3 million to the pledge total.190 Thus, as an organization “[reliant] 
on advertising to motivate donors,” the ARA unequivocally benefitted from the shrewd 
upper class appeals first perfected by the CRB.191 
The ARA also succeeded through traditional middle class appeals that 
underscored the plight of children—especially during its second incarnation. In the 
summer of 1919, the United States government privatized the ARA, enabling it to 
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continue relief efforts in Central Europe.192 In 1921, however, a historically acute famine 
began ravaging Soviet Russia, prompting the ARA to expand its operations eastward.193 
Utilizing the same distribution networks and volunteers as the CRB and the ARA in 
Central Europe, the ARA in Russia provided 90 percent of all humanitarian aid during 
the two-year famine, delivering more than 768,000 tons of food, medicine, and clothing 
to save millions of individuals; but equally as integral to the ARA’s success was the 
“massive” propaganda campaign it sponsored, for it generated “a keen sympathy on the 
part of the American public towards the Russian people” at a time when the United 
States was collectively wary of the Communist takeover.194 
 Unlike the CRB, the ARA did not directly participate in public appeals, as Hoover 
reasoned that doing so would compound gratuitous competition amongst the myriad 
organizations legitimately working for Russian relief; nevertheless, it permitted 
organizations directly contributing to the ARA to continue its fundraising efforts—most 
notably the American Red Cross (ARC).195 The ARC had emerged as one of the most 
influential middle class networks by 1918, boasting 20 million members—up from 
20,000 in 1914—on account of its wartime operations outside the CRB’s purview.196 
During the famine in Russia, the ARC entered into a partnership with the ARA whereby 
the ARC would “furnish relief entirely through the Medical Division of the [ARA].”197 
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The ARC was thus one of the organizations allowed to fundraise under the ARA’s 
auspices, following Hoover’s directive to “make some distinction between the Russian 
people”—particularly the guiltless children—“and the group who [had] seized the 
government.”198 
Over the course of the First World War, “visual propaganda” came to supersede 
the customary published appeals that the CRB favored.199 Propagandists assisting the 
belligerent governments refined this art by utilizing “forceful images, touching stories, 
[and] moralistic narration” in their films and photograph collections.200 After the war, the 
ARC exploited the advent of this new propaganda genre on an incredible scale: its 
American Red Cross Magazine—delivered to all 20 million members—illustrated “the 
spectacle of suffering on every page [to clamor] for readers’ compassion and charity.”201 
These renderings surely enabled millions of middle class Americans to identify the 
difference between starving Russian children and the unsavory Bolsheviks, making 
financial contributions to the ARC both reasonable and painless. The ARC’s use of visual 
propaganda ultimately proved fruitful, allowing it to ship $3.8 million worth of medical 
supplies for the joint ARA-ARC effort in Russia.202 In sum, the public appeals of the 
CRB—and later the ARA—augmented “the two largest humanitarian operations of the 
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early twentieth century,” saving millions of lives and setting a standard for prudent public 
relations in subsequent humanitarian movements.203 
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